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Abstract We review the literature on bargaining and distribution experiments to
investigate whether changes in stake size have significant effects on behaviour in
laboratory/field settings. We conclude that experiments in this field do not lead to
clear/common results. The joint presence of opposing factors (e.g., increasing rela-
tive risk aversion and increasing cost of fairness) might be one reason contributing to
this. Moreover, we argue that variables such as subjects’ financial conditions, cogni-
tive abilities, risk attitudes, loss-aversion, justice orientations, and relevant personality
characteristics should be controlled in laboratory experiments to understand the effect
of stake size on behaviour, more clearly. Finally, quasi-experiments using data from
(very) high-stake games/events and meta-analysis studies should complement (indi-
vidual) controlled experiments.
Keywords Bargaining experiments · Dictator game · Distribution experiments ·
Fairness · Stake size · Ultimatum game
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In this study we examine the effect of changes in stake-size on behaviour in experi-
mental bargaining and distribution games. The question is closely related to the use of
material/financial incentives in experiments and constitutes one of the methodological
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principles that define experimental economics. The use of material incentives/rewards
is a major debate between experimental economists and (experimental) psychologists.
There have been many studies on this controversial issue with different results. For
example, Smith and Walker (1993), Camerer and Hogarth (1999), Holt and Laury
(2002), Camerer (2010), Murayama et al. (2010), and Kang et al. (2011) all found
that material rewards have significant effects on decisions and motivations of subjects.
Kühberger (2001), on the other hand, found that the use of hypothetical rewards would
be sufficient in decision-making experiments, and Read (2005) argued that monetary
incentives are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate cognitive exertion, motiva-
tional focus, or emotional triggers.
If one acknowledges the effect of monetary incentive mechanisms on subjects’
behaviour, this brings yet another important question: does stake-size affect behaviour?
This is the main question we deal with in this survey study. The significance of the
answer to this question, which concerns both economic theorists and experimental
economists, can be summarized under two main titles: (i) the generality of economic
theories and (ii) the external validity of experimental studies.1 Needless to say, our
conclusions would also be of interest to (experimental) psychologists.
In most (mainstream) theoretical models in economics, results (or predictions) are
independent of the amount of monetary stakes. For example, in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibriumof the ultimatumgamewith standard preferences for players, predic-
tions about players’ behaviour are independent of the amount of resources distributed
in the game. Similarly, the standard model of rational behaviour would not predict
agent’s behaviour in the dictator game to change even if the money at stake changes.
Finally, the scale invariance axiom (and its variants) frequently utilized in axiomatic
bargaining theory leads to similar results as far as stake-size effect is concerned. There-
fore, experimental studies that vary monetary incentives can play an important role in
testing the generality or robustness of these theoretical models. Hence, by examining
the results of various bargaining and distribution experiments in which different stake
sizes are used, our study may help us understand the robustness of theoretical models
in this field.2
On the other hand, one of the main criticisms against experimental economics is
that monetary incentives used in experiments are quite small, thereby questioning
the external validity of the results (see Bolle 1990; Falk and Fehr 2003, p. 401; Guala
2005). Levitt and List (2007) took an eclectic position against this criticism by arguing
that experiments using small monetary incentives are still important since they can
facilitate a better understanding of our daily economic transactions. However, they
also pointed out that it is necessary to use larger monetary incentives to test whether it
makes a difference, and accordingly, to provide feedback on whether economic agents
change their behaviour as stakes change. Analysing the results of experiments that use
1 A relatively recent yet influential book by Bardsley et al. (2010) devoted two chapters to these issues.
2 We do not focus on the effects of a presence (real) versus absence (hypothetical) of financial incentives
here (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2001 for a great discussion). Nevertheless, for the sake of giving a more
complete picture we will include some studies comparing behavioral patterns in ultimatum, dictator, and
trust games with real versus hypothetical stakes.
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different stake sizes offers an opportunity to investigate whether criticisms concerning
the external validity of experiments are empirically valid.
These results would also be important for more pragmatic reasons. Firstly, if there
is enough evidence in favour of no stake size effect hypothesis, this can provide a
basis for running (bargaining and distribution) experiments at more reasonable costs
(see Gillis and Hettler 2007 for a similar argument). Secondly, if the accumulated
evidence suggests that small variations in stake-size cannot change behaviour, then
researchers focusing on questions other than stake-size but varying the stake-size (at
a small margin) for the sake of robustness, should either abandon these efforts or start
using much larger stake-size variations.
Finally, aword about our focus on bargaining and distribution experiments.Camerer
and Hogarth (1999) found that stake-size effects may vary across different tasks in a
systematic fashion (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2001 for a similar result). Therefore,
we do not claim that our conclusions extend to all possible tasks, economic environ-
ments, games etc. We limit our attention to bargaining and distribution games. Since
the emergence of experimental economics, bargaining and distribution games have
always attracted great interest. It would possibly not be an exaggeration to say that
after individual choice under uncertainty, bargaining and distribution games are two
of the most-studied settings in the experimental economics literature. Not surpris-
ingly, ultimatum and dictator games have been very popular test-beds for stake-size
effects.
1.2 Earlier Studies
There are a few earlier studies which are similar to the study presented in this paper.
In the first, Smith and Walker (1993) analysed 31 studies—using a variety of stakes
and monetary incentives—in light of a formal model which assumed that decision-
making has a cognitive cost. They discovered that for higher stakes, the results centre
around the predictions of theoretical models, i.e. an increase in monetary incentives
forces/encourages individuals to behave more rationally. Another conclusion of the
study was that an increase in monetary incentives decreases the variance observed in
the behaviour. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) analysed 74 experimental studies using (i)
no monetary incentives, (ii) low monetary incentives, and (iii) high monetary incen-
tives. They investigated the effects of monetary incentives on behaviour in various
experimental games. They found that, especially in decision-making experiments in
which extra effort had a positive impact on the performance, higher monetary incen-
tives increased performance.
In his book, Camerer (2003) included a subsection on stake-size effects in ultima-
tum game and bargaining experiments. Based on findings from earlier studies on the
presence of stake-size effects, he concluded that if there is a stake-size effect at all, it
is surprisingly weak.3 Konow (2005), in a survey paper, studied how information and
3 Bearden (2001) surveyed ultimatum game experiments and he had a section in the survey on the stake
size effect. He concluded similarly by saying that the effects found were weaker than he thought and further
data is needed for better understanding.
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stake size influence subjects’ fairness concerns and behaviour in distribution/sharing
experiments. The conclusion he arrived at by considering a number of ultimatum
and dictator game experiments was that neither subjects’ behaviour nor their fairness
concerns exhibit systematic variations across experiments using low stakes and high
stakes.
Our paper differs from the first two due to our focus on bargaining and distribution
experiments, and it departs from all four due to our recommendations for subject
recruitment and data collection. Finally, we also cover the most recent studies, some
of which used considerably larger stakes and had results drastically different than the
earlier ones.4
1.3 Conclusions and the Organisation of the Paper
In light of our observations, we argue that (i) the number of papers studying the
effect of stake-size on individual behaviour is not sufficient to reach solid conclusions
(possibly except for ultimatum games), (ii) including ultimatum game experiments,
findings do not deliver a clear and consistent message as to the effect of stake-size
on individual behaviour, (iii) differences in findings and the lack of a unique message
may stem from the co-existence of effects such as increasing relative risk aversion
and increasing fairness costs, which are usually not controlled in analyses,5 small
sample sizes, uncontrolled yet relevant factors, different samples (e.g., students, pro-
fessionals), and different incentive mechanisms (e.g., real vs. hypothetical stakes, full
vs. lottery payments etc.) used in different studies (iv) liberally high stake-sizes may
be needed (e.g. Andersen et al. 2011; Goldreich and Pomorski 2011) to be able to
observe behaviour that is in line with predictions of theoretical models in bargaining
and distribution games experiments, and (v) quasi-experiments using data from high-
stake tournaments, contests, television shows etc. and meta-analysis studies are two
promising (and complementary) sources in our quest for answers.
One particular message that these observations do give is that experimental
studies—on the effect of stake-size on behaviour or in general–require more “control”:
it is essential to conduct experiments that control subjects’ income levels, cognitive
abilities, financial needs, risk attitudes, loss-aversion, fairness concerns, and other rel-
evant personality traits to thoroughly understand the effect of stake size on individual
behaviour. The presence of uncontrolled yet relevant factors and an exclusive focus
on average behaviour is likely to be a reason for mixed results.
We also want to emphasize that the type of strategic interaction, the payment
method, and the particular experimental design used in a study may have an impact on
4 It is worth mentioning that we included also working papers that are not published yet to avoid possible
publication biases that may arise in survey studies. We also want to mention that we cover around fifty
studies after 1999, which is the publication date of Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
5 For instance, a proposer who becomes increasingly risk averse as the stake increases may tend to make
proportionally more generous offers. On the other hand, if he believes that fairness is a normal good (for the
responder) and the cost of behaving fair-mindedly increases as offers become more generous in absolute
terms, he may make more generous offers in absolute terms but less generous in relative terms. Hence, the
net effect can be indeterminate.
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the stake-size effect. In what follows, we report studies that marginally vary the stake
size (e.g., $1–$6 or e4 vs. e8) and find a significant stake-size effect and studies that
significantly vary the stake size (e.g., $10 vs. $100, or $200 vs. $20,000) and do not
find any. We think that understanding and pointing out the characteristics of strategic
interactions and design elements that have a systematic influence on stake-size effects
is a promising research agenda.
Another point we want to draw attention to is about the use of quasi-experiments.
Certain real-life contests, games, television shows etc. are potentially good test-beds
for stake-size effects since they involve very large sums ofmoneywhich are practically
impossible to have in lab experiments. We think that an increase in the number of such
studies will be beneficial. We also believe that lab experiments that use subject recruit-
ment and data collection methods we propose in this paper and quasi-experiments of
the sort we mention above are complements rather than substitutes. The former aims
to (and can) have a lot of control, but cannot afford to have very large stakes; and the
latter has a certain lack of control (compared to lab experiments) but can afford very
large stakes.
Finally, more meta-analysis studies would be helpful in obtaining more robust
and statistically powerful results than individual experiments. They also offer more
objective and informative results than literature reviews.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 we review the literature to find the-
oretical models/arguments for the presence of stake-size effects, mention predictions
of these models, and outline the essential factors that should be incorporated in theo-
retical models that aim to study/capture stake-size effects. In Sects. 3 and 4 we review
bargaining and distribution experiments, respectively. In these sections, we follow a
chronological order in presenting the results from different studies. In the “Appendix”
we also provide a summary table (see Tables 5, 6) where we group these studies
according to their findings (e.g., whether a stake-size effect is found or not). We pro-
vide some methodological suggestions for subject recruitment and data collection in
Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes.6
2 Theoretical Arguments
We believe that going through theoretical arguments about stake-size effects is almost
a pre-requisite for studying the experimental literature on the topic since doing so can
help in setting benchmarks about what to expect. Accordingly, we first touch upon
theoretical arguments dealing with changes in stake size. For reader-friendliness (e.g.,
to avoid a lot of notation), we stick to verbal argumentation of theoretical models. The
summary of predictions from these studies can also be found in Table 1.
Variations of standard theoretical models already set forth some predictions about
how stake size affects individual behaviour. For example, under social preferences or
the possibility that players can make mistakes, Markowitz’s (1952) and Menezes and
6 In some of the studies we investigate, the effect of stake-size on individual behaviour is not the main
research question. Rather, the authors implement different stake-sizes to test the robustness of their results.
When we report such studies, we focus on those parts where they test for stake-size effects.
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Table 1 Summary table of theoretical predictions
Reference Argument/theory Implication or prediction
Markowitz (1952) Increasing relative risk
aversion
Proposals, in an ultimatum game,
increase with stake-size
Menezes and Hanson (1970) Increasing relative risk
aversion




Framing/loss-aversion Ultimatum proposals increase with
stake-size
Thaler (1988) Responders’ minimum acceptable
offers in an ultimatum game
increase less than proportionally as
stakes increase
Bolton (1991) Comparative model of
bargaining
If fairness is a normal good,
proposals in an ultimatum game
increases with stake-size
Telser (1993) Cost of fairness Fairness is a normal good. Hence, as
the cost of rejecting an offer
increases, rejections will be less
frequently observed
Smith and Walker (1993) Smith–Walker hypothesis As the money at stake increases,
people will make better, more
rational decisions and these
decisions will be around rational
predictions with a smaller variance
Rabin (1993) Fairness equilibrium Material concerns dominate fairness
related concerns as stakes increase
significantly. As a result, reciprocal
behaviour will be observed less
under very high stakes
Hoffman et al. (1996) The tendency to avoid the rejection
risk in the ultimatum game
increases with the stake-size
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) Theory of equity, reciprocity,
and competition
Rejections of unfair offers will
vanish as stake size increases
Dickinson (2000) Rabin’s reciprocal kindness
theory
Ultimatum offers become less fair
and less fair offers are accepted
more as stake size increases
Bolton and DeBruyn (2008) Agents make less mistakes and their
behaviour is less erratic around
rational decisions
Camerer et al. (2015) Revelation principle of
Myerson (1979, 1984)
Disagreement rates in an
unstructured bargaining with
asymmetric information on the
stake-size will be monotonically
decreasing in stake size
Hanson’s (1970) increasing partial risk-aversion hypothesis suggest that when the
amount to share is high, subjects who make offers (as the party facing the risk of being
rejected) will make proportionally more generous offers compared to the cases when
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the amount to share is lower in the ultimatum game.7 If the behaviour of the player
who faces risk is in line with the increasing partial risk-aversion hypothesis, then his
tendency to avoid risk (of rejection) increases as themoney at stake increases. Thus, he
will make proportionally more generous offers (for instance, given that the responder
has social preferences). The study byHoffman et al. (1996) featured a similar argument
where, again, the tendency to avoid risk (of rejection) increases with stake-size.
Another prediction on how stake-size influences individual behaviour can be
obtained using the well-known framing effect by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
According to this argument, individuals tend to base their decisions more on potential
losses than gains. Therefore, if the proposer believes that the responder may value
fairness, then the proposer’s decision, when making an offer in the ultimatum game,
will depend more on the amount that he may lose in case of a rejection rather than the
amount that he may gain in case of an acceptance. As a result, proposers will tend to
make more generous offers in games with high stakes since the amount lost is larger
in case of a rejection.
Thaler (1988), observing the first ever ultimatum game experiment in the literature,
made some predictions about an ultimatum game with $1000 or $100,000. His predic-
tion was that the minimum amount that responders are willing to accept will increase
non-linearly—at a decreasing rate—with the stake size. Additionally, he argued that
the minimum acceptable offer is proportional to responder’s wealth; and he concludes
that resisting unjust offers (behaving fair-mindedly) is a normal good. Note that all
three arguments mentioned above require deviations from standard (e.g., selfish, ratio-
nal) preferences.
Thaler’s argument overlaps with Telser’s (1993) cost of fairness argument. Accord-
ing to Telser (1993), there is a cost associated with behaving in line with fairness
considerations. For instance, the amount of money a responder foregoes by rejecting
an unfair offer in an ultimatum game can be seen as the cost of behaving fair-mindedly.
If behaving fair-mindedly is a normal good (see Zwick and Chen 1999 for supporting
results), then other things remaining same, the individual is expected to behave less
fair-mindedly as the price (or the cost) of doing so increases. The impact of this on
the ultimatum game behaviour is that responders will be likely to accept offers that
are high in absolute terms but low in relative terms (e.g., $1000 offer in an ultimatum
game where $100,000 is at stake).
Bolton (1991), in a seminal piece of work, argued that agents may derive utility not
only from absolute monetary earnings but also from relative monetary earnings. What
he called as relative money is the difference between what one agent gets from bar-
gaining agreement and what the other agent gets. In his model, the effect of increasing
stake-size depends on whether fairness is a normal or an inferior good and subjects’
risk attitudes. In particular, he argued that if fairness is a normal good, then offers will
increase as stake-size increases under complete information.
Almost all the predictions presented above are related to individual behaviour in
ultimatum games. On the other hand, Smith and Walker’s (1993) study is related to
how individuals react behaviourally to increases in financial/monetary incentives. In
7 This hypothesis is empirically supported by studies such as Binswanger (1981), Kachelmeier and Shehata
(1992), Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), Andersen et al. (2008), Baltussen et al. (2008) and Post et al. (2008).
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line with the argument that claims decision-making is an activity which has a cognitive
cost, Smith and Walker (1993) proposed that higher potential losses or gains will lead
individuals to think more thoroughly and make more rational decisions.8 Therefore,
Smith and Walker (1993) predicted that subject behaviour in experiments where large
financial incentives are used will be accumulated around the predictions of theoretical
models which assume rationality. Analyses they conducted on 31 experimental studies
confirmed their predictions.
Rabin (1993) introduced the fairness equilibrium in an attempt to incorporate fair-
ness into game theory and economics. In his model, reciprocating opponent’s actions
would enhance agent’s fairness-related payoff. Thus, positive and negative recipro-
cation both have a potential to increase agent’s payoffs. The crucial element is that
there is a trade-off between fairness payoff and material payoff; and fairness pay-
off is bounded whereas material payoff is not. Rabin’s model predicts that if stakes
increase significantly, material payoff concerns will dominate fairness related con-
cerns. As a result, less reciprocity should be observed in games with considerably high
stakes; and predictions of the standard theoretical models with selfish and rational
agents should be consistent with data if stakes are liberally high. Later, Dickin-
son (2000) applied Rabin’s reciprocal kindness theory to an ultimatum bargaining
model and derived qualitatively similar predictions for proposer offers and responder
decisions.
In an elegant calibration exercise that used data from multiple bargaining studies
Bolton and DeBruyn (2008) outlined a theoretical model of bargaining behaviour
based on quantal responses. Therefore, they included in their model the possibility
that agents’ make mistakes.9 Their model predicted that as the stake-size gets larger,
agents will make less mistakes and their behaviour will be less erratic around rational
decisions. In the same paper, the authors showed that this model fits the data well.
Recently, Camerer et al. (2015) took on a challenging task. Unstructured bargaining
experiments mostly use cooperative bargaining solution concepts to derive theoreti-
cal predictions since the strategy spaces of such bargaining protocols are extremely
complex to be modelled as a non-cooperative game. Nevertheless, their model can
provide predictions on disagreement rates independent of the bargaining protocol,
and the results are only based on information conditions. They modelled an unstruc-
tured bargaining game where the pie size is known by only one of the players and the
other player only knows the distribution from which the pie is drawn. They showed
that if the bargaining mechanism satisfies individual rationality (both players prefer to
participate in the mechanism) and incentive compatibility (the informed party has an
incentive to tell the true pie size), then (i) the disagreement rates will be monotonically
decreasing in the pie size and (ii) the uninformed party’s payoff is weakly increasing
in the pie size.
8 This argument (i.e., decision-making has cognitive costs) is supported by recent neuro-scientific research.
For further reading, the reader is referred to McGuire and Botvinick (2010).
9 Their model used Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) inequity averse preferences as a primitive. Note that,
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Rabin (1993) both imply that as the stakes increase, rejections of unfair
offers will vanish.
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It is worthwhile emphasizing the differences between the two main transmission
channels for stake-size effects observed in these studies. In particular, models with
standard preferences and full rationality cannot account for stake-size effects. Incor-
porating the possibility of mistakes or fairness concerns into theoretical models opens
a transmission channel for stake-size effects on behaviour. Naturally, predictions from
such models will be different than that of models with standard assumptions. In partic-
ular, in models where players can make mistakes, increases in stake-size will decrease
the likelihood of such mistakes and bring equilibrium behaviour closer to the predic-
tions of models with fully rational players. On the other hand, in models where players
have social preferences, most researchers found that increases in stake-size leads to
more selfish behaviour.
Setting up a full-fledge theoretical model of how individual behaviour responds
to variations in stake size for all the (non)strategic distribution problems we cover
goes beyond the aims and scope this paper. However, we can still outline some of the
elements such a model should have.
1. Decision Quality Strategic decisions involve/require significant cognitive activity
and such activity is costly (at best, cognitive resources are limited). Thus, a good
model of stake-size effects should incorporate decisionquality or cognitive effort as
a function of (expected) return.Allowingmistakes and assuming that the likelihood
of mistakes is decreasing in money at stake, a la quantal response models would
be one way to do so.
2. Risk Attitudes Most of the situations/problems we cover here involve risk for
one or more decision-maker(s). Increasing relative risk aversion appears to be an
essential element to include if one wants to explain behavioural differences across
low versus high stake strategic situations involving risk.
3. Prospect Theory, Reference Points, Loss Aversion The presence of prospect the-
oretic preferences and/or reference-dependent behaviour can influence the way
monetary payoffs are perceived/evaluated. Moreover, recent studies (e.g., Fehr-
Duda et al. 2010;Vieider 2012) showed that stake-size variations can also influence
the way individuals weigh probabilities on good and bad outcomes. If there are
obvious reference points or clear reasons to believe in reference-dependent behav-
iour in the economic environment to be modelled, incorporating these elements
may be necessary in order to study stake-size effects.
4. Non-monetary Factors Influencing Utility Experimental evidence showing that
individuals care about fairness, equality (or equity), honesty, social norms, loy-
alty, keeping promises etc. is abundant. Moreover, the relative price ratio between
any of these concerns and monetary payoffs is most probably not constant but
rather depends on the money at stake. Furthermore, neither increasing relative risk
aversion nor prospect theory preferences alone can imply stake size effects if indi-
viduals have standard, selfish preferences with an exclusive focus over monetary
payoffs. Therefore, depending on the specific economic environment, one or more
of these factors (e.g., concerns for fairness, honesty, promise-keeping, loyalty etc.)
should be incorporated into a model that aims to capture stake-size effects. One
way to do this may be to allow inequity aversion parameters in Fehr–Schmidt
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294 E. Karagözoğlu, Ü. B. Urhan
(1999) (or Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) models to be functions of stake size rather
than constants (see Güth et al. 2007 for a similar argument).
5. The Source of the Money at Stake The experimental evidence since early 2000s
consistently shows that bargaining and distributive behaviour differs in games
where the money at stake is produced by the involved parties from the ones where
the money is manna from heaven (see Karagözoğlu 2012). In particular, if and
when the resource (or money) is jointly produced through efforts, investments
or any costly actions, then they play a significant role in the distribution stage. A
typical finding is that individuals (more strongly) defend their rights or entitlements
which they derive from their contribution to the production and an accompanying
justice ideal (e.g., egalitarianism, liberalism, libertarianism). Therefore, stake-size
variations caused by individuals’ efforts may have different impacts on behaviour
than variations caused by exogenous/stochastic factors.
Needless to mention, some of these factors are more essential in certain economic
environments than in others. For instance, resorting to non-monetary factors influenc-
ing utility would be more reasonable than to risk-aversion or decision quality if one
studies behaviour in dictator games.
3 Bargaining Experiments
In this section, we review the studies on bargaining experiments where stake size is
varied. We group bargaining experiments according to the bargaining protocols they
employ. The most popular bargaining protocol in the experimental literature is the
ultimatum game. Accordingly, we first focus on ultimatum game experiments. Some
other bargaining protocols used in bargaining experiments are Nash demand game,
unstructured/semi-structured bargaining, and Rubinstein–Ståhl (or alternating offers)
bargaining. We group them as “other bargaining games”.
3.1 Ultimatum Games
Take two agents A and B who are anonymous to each other. Assume that a certain
amount of money is given to agent A (proposer) who is then asked to decide on what
part of this money to offer to agent B (responder). Denoting the amount of money
with M , let’s say agent A offers X to agent B and gets M− X for himself. Now, agent
B has two options: accept A’s offer or reject it. If he accepts, M will be distributed in
line with A’s offer, i.e., A receives M − X and B receives X . If he rejects, both agents
receive zero.
The simple bargaining game we describe above is known as the ultimatum game.
Under standard rationality assumptions and standard preferences, the theoretical pre-
diction for the outcome of this game is: A offers the lowest possible amount to B and
B accepts this offer.10 The reason is: if both sides are rational (and if the rationality
10 This is the subgameperfectNash equilibrium (SPNE)prediction.Nash equilibrium (NE) concept predicts
other outcomes, as well. Nevertheless, SPNE is much more frequently employed in extensive form games
(such as the ultimatum game) due to a weakness of NE in capturing sequential rationality.
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of agents are common knowledge), then it is common knowledge that B will accept
anything greater than zero. Thus, A will offer the lowest possible amount.
The first experimental study testing this prediction was conducted by Güth et al.
1982. This study featured two main experiments (simple vs. complex game). The
purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the level of complexity affects
bargaining results. This classic study is one of the first to show that individuals may
systematically behave differently than the predictions of (standard) game theoretic
models. In particular, in the experiments of Güth et al. (1982), proposers offered
noteworthy amounts and responders generally did not accept low offers.
With a different perspective, Thaler (1988) brought up the question: How would
proposals and responses look like when the stake size is much larger (e.g. $1000 or
$100,000). First (partial) answer to this question was given in Camerer’s work in 1990.
In his study, Camerer (1990) showed that varying the stake size ($12 and $120) does
not lead to a significantly different behaviour: proposals (respectively, 39 and 38%)
and accepted lowest amounts (respectively, 21 and 15%) were identical across two
stake sizes.
The results of early ultimatum game experiments were very interesting as much
as they were in stark contrast with what theory suggests. A very natural question that
arose was the generalizability of these results across different cultures. Roth et al.
(1991) analysed behaviour in the ultimatum game with experiments conducted in
Israel (Jerusalem), Japan (Tokyo), USA (Pittsburgh) and Yugoslavia (Ljubljana).11
Throughout these experiments, each subject played the same game 10 times. In the
experimental sessions in the USA, the authors used $10 versus $30. They did not find
any difference in behaviour across ultimatum game experiments with $10 and $30.
A decade after Güth et al. (1982), one popular explanation for the behaviour
observed in ultimatum game experiments all around the world was fairness. Respon-
ders may reject small but positive offers because they consider them to be unfair; and
proposers, either being fair-minded people or being afraid of facing a fair-minded
opponent, propose fair shares. Forsythe et al. (1994), in their seminal work, exam-
ined whether the ultimatum proposals are related to proposers’ fairness perceptions.
They argued that if the main factor influencing proposals is fairness, then proposer
behaviour in ultimatum and dictator games12 should not differ. Their study tested the
fairness hypothesis by comparing proposer behaviour across ultimatum and dictator
games. Another tested hypothesis was whether paying subjects has an effect on their
decisions or not. In addition, the study also analysed the effect of increasing the value
at stake.
The experiment included both ultimatum and dictator games with $5 stakes. To test
the empirical validity of their hypotheses, two experimentswere carried out. Toobserve
the effect of the change in stake size, another experimentwith $10 stakewas conducted.
Results did not show any significant difference in behaviour across experiments with
11 This article consists of two sections which are the bargaining game and the market game. From the point
of the current study, only the bargaining section is explained.
12 In the dictator game, like in the ultimatum game, first player proposes a division. However, there is no
decision to be made for the second player, i.e., the second player cannot accept or reject. In other words,
the first player rather dictates the division. Hence the name, dictator game.
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$5 and $10 stakes. On the other hand, when stakes were hypothetical (i.e., no real
monetary incentives) proposers behaved more fairly.13 More importantly, dictator
and ultimatum game behaviour of proposers were found to be different, rejecting the
explanatory power of fairness hypothesis: in the dictator game experiment with $5
stake, 36% of dictators offered nothing, while only 21% made an equal or better
offers. However, in the ultimatum game experiment with the same stake size, 65%
of the offers were equal or better offers. The same result was valid for $10 stake: the
percentage of equal offers in the ultimatum game increased up to 75%, whereas in the
dictator game and the percentage of zero offers is 21% and the percentage of equal or
better offers dropped to 21%. This was a very striking result at the time but in light of
the literature we survey in this paper, it is not very surprising given that stakes used in
the study were both on the lower end.
Tompkinson and Bethwaite (1995) re-investigated Thaler’s (1988) question on the
effect of higher stake size on proposals and responses in the ultimatum game. The
difference between this study and many others in the literature lies in their incentive
structure and the subject profile: subjects in this study were professional lawyers and
they were asked to share $10 or $10,000, hypothetically. They were also asked their
minimum acceptable offers. Thus, each subject took the role of both proposer and
responder. The experimental design included three different games:
(i) Game 1 The subjects were asked how much they would offer as an allocator
and specify their minimum acceptable offers. It’s a $10 game and offers can be
multiples of $1. Finally, the minimum possible offer is $1.
(ii) Game 2 The same with Game 1. The only difference is that it’s a $10,000 game
and offers can be multiples of $1. The minimum possible offer is $1.
(iii) Game 3 The same with Game 2. The only difference is that offers can only be
multiples of $1000. The minimum possible offer is $1000.
Results, as can be seen in Table 2, show that the average proposal was $4.3 and
the average accepted offer was $3.6 in Game 1. In Game 2, these numbers turned out
to be $3611 and $2599, respectively. Furthermore, in Game 3 they slightly increased
to $3790 and $2883, respectively. In Game 1, 29% of the subjects were willing to
accept the minimum possible offer (i.e., $1). In Game 2, only 16% of the subjects
were willing to accept the minimum possible offer (i.e., $1). Understandably, in Game
3, 44% of subjects were willing to accept the minimum possible offer (i.e., $1000).
Looking at modal minimum acceptable offers across three games tell a similar story:
the modal minimum acceptable offers are 5, 5000, and 1000 in Game 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. Mean offers dropped as stake-size increased. Finally, the percentage of
subjects applying a fair-division (game theory) strategy of “accept half of the pie, offer
half of the pie” (“accept and offer the minimum possible offer”) is lower (higher) in
Games 2 and 3 (Game 3) than in Game 1 (Games 1 and 2).
These results are in line with the hypothesis that increasing the stake and denom-
inations both lead to more selfish proposals. This is one of the earliest studies that
13 Later, Gillis and Hettler (2007) conducted a multiple-round ultimatum game experiment with real versus
hypothetical stakes ($10) and found mixed results. In particular, subjects offered—on average—less in the
hypothetical stake treatment. However, this effect was not present in the first round of play but became
apparent in later rounds.
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Table 2 Tompkinson and Bethwaite 1995—summary of results
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
Offers Min. accept. Offers Min. accept. Offers Min. accept.
Mean 4.3 3.6 3611.7 2599 3790.7 2883.7
Median 5 5 5000 3000 5000 3000
Mode 5 5 5000 5000 5000 1000
This table is regenerated from Table 1 in Tompkinson and Bethwaite (1995)
found a stake-size effect. Nevertheless, the results relied on hypothetical decisions.
Given the results of the studies showing that monetary incentives influence behaviour,
this raises questions on their generalizability.
All studies investigating proposer and responder behaviour in the ultimatum game
and varying stake size have assumed that both players have complete and symmetric
information about the size of the stake. Straub and Murnighan (1995) is an exception:
they asked what would happen when subjects have imperfect information on stake
size.14 To answer this question, they asked all subjects the following questions: (i)
if you were a proposer and the other side knew the stake size, what offer would you
make? (ii) if you were a proposer and the other side did not know the stake size, what
offer would you make? (iii) if you were a responder and you knew the stake size, how
would you respond to the offer made to you? (iv) if you were a responder and you did
not know the stake size, how would you respond to the offer made to you?
Subjects were presented a series of offers and asked which of them they would
accept; and if they would accept none of these offers, they were asked their minimum
acceptable offers. First, in the case where stake size was unknown, subjects were
given the following offers: $1, $0.5, $0.15, $0.25, $5, $0.01, $3.5 and, $0.05. After
that, they were given the information that stake size was $10 and were asked to decide
on following offers: $0.05, $1.5, $0.75, $2, $0.10, $0.40, $5, $0.01, $3. After these two
questions, for five different stake sizes ($30, $50, $60, $80, and $100), they were asked
their minimum acceptable offers. Then, they were asked their minimum acceptable
offers on two hypothetical stakes ($1000 and $1,000,000).
In the following part of the experiment, subjects were confronted with a series of
questions about their offers in the presence of different stake sizes. First, assuming that
the other agent knew the stake size, they were asked their offers in the following stake
sizes: $10, $1, 5$, $50, $60, $80. Additionally, they were also faced with hypothetical
stake sizes of $1000 and$1,000,000.After this part, theywere asked the samequestions
but now under the assumption that the other agent did not know the stake size. Subjects
were paid on the basis of one randomly selected non-hypothetical decision.
When the stake size was unknown, 29 subjects out of 45 declared $0.01 as their
minimum acceptable offer. They even mentioned that they will accept “any offer”.
14 Another well-known study on ultimatum games where the stake-size is asymmetric information is Nagel
andMitzkewitz (1993). In that study, possible stake sizes were DM1.20, DM2.40, DM3.60, DM4.80, DM6,
and DM7.20. The authors reported differences in behaviour across (two versions of the) ultimatum games
with different stake sizes.
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Nevertheless, when stake-size information was complete, this rate fell to 11 out of
45. Interestingly, the same kind of difference was valid for hypothetical values as
well. It can be said that the game theoretical prediction for the ultimatum game under
complete and symmetric information on the stake size was observed in the ultimatum
game with asymmetric information on the stake size.
Moreover, the authors found evidence for a relationship between the minimum
acceptable offer and stake size. While for $10–$100 stakes, 20% was the mean min-
imum acceptable offer, this rate falls to 16.6% for a $1000 stake and to 10.5% for a
$1,000,000 stake. These results are in line with “fairness” being a normal good. On
the other hand, in both perfect and imperfect information cases, offers increased (in
the absolute sense) with stake size.
In early studies of ultimatum games testing stake size effects, experiments using
stakes higher than $10 were either done with hypothetical stakes or the random pay-
ment method. Hoffman et al. (1996) took one step forward and raised the stakes to
(real, not hypothetical) $100 to test the same question over again. They also included
a game with $10 to compare the results. The experiment implemented two selection
criteria in determining subjects’ roles. One of them was the standard random selection
whereas the other one determined subject roles on the basis of their performance in
a general knowledge quiz. Subjects were asked ten general knowledge questions and
according to their results, the first-ranked player was paired with the seventh-ranked,
the second-ranked playerwas pairedwith eight etc.Here, each better performing player
was labelled as a “seller” and his/her partner was labelled as a “buyer”. The ultimatum
game was played between the matched pairs. Offers could be multiples of $10 from a
$100 stake. After responders responded to their offers, payments were made accord-
ingly. The results did not show any significant difference between offers in games with
different stakes. This was valid for both selection criteria. However, offers were lower
(less generous), again, under both stake sizes when the subject roles were determined
on the basis of performances in the quiz. This is in line with a hypothesis that when
proposers believe they deserved or earned their role, they will derive entitlements and
will offer less. The fact that the authors did not observe any stake-size effect was a
significant result in the light of a reasonably large stake of $100.
Budgetary restrictions are great obstacles to conducting experiments to test the
presence/absence of a stake-size effect. Since earlier studies have already shown that
mild increases in stakes are not likely to effect behaviour, much larger stakes should
be employed. This is particularly difficult in the developed west. Bob Slonim and
Roth (1998) found a way to tackle this problem: they conducted their ultimatum
game experiment in Slovakia, which enabled them to use very large stakes. Beside
the stake-size effect, they also investigated the existence of a learning effect with
a multiple-round design. Stakes used in the experiment were 60 Slovak Korún, 300
SlovakKorún, and 1500 SlovakKorún. These amountswere equivalent to 2.5, 12.5 and
62.5 hourly wages, respectively. All subjects were randomly divided into proposer and
responder roles, and played the ultimatum game ten times, each time with a different
player. Subjects started first round without any experience which they gained in the
subsequent rounds. All games were played with 1000 points stake size, where offers
could bemultiples of 5 points. On the other hand, the exchange rate between points and
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Korún varied: 1000 points were made equal to 60 Slovak Korún, 300 Slovak Korún,
and 1500 Slovak Korún.
Their results showed that when players were inexperienced, there was no difference
in their behaviour across games with different stakes. Similarly, without experience,
responses to these offers were the same no matter the stake size. Nevertheless, when
the game was played repetitively, behaviour started to change in a systematic fashion.
In particular, as players became more experienced, the average offers slowly declined
in high stakes but not in low stakes; and rejections were lower in high stakes than in
low stakes. In particular, over all offers, the rejection rate was 17.1% in low stakes,
12.1% in medium stakes, and 8.8% in high stakes. For offers that gave the responder
less than half of the pie, these numbers were 25.6, 16, and 13.6%, respectively.
Slonim–Roth study is a seminal contribution for mainly three reasons: (i) it is one
of the first studies that showed that rejection rates decrease as stake size increases,
(ii) it is the first study to show that experience mediates the effect of stake size on
behaviour, and (iii) it shows that the reason for the change in the proposer behaviour
may be traced back to the change in the responder behaviour in repeated settings (i.e.,
proposers learning to make lower offers).
Hoffman et al. (1996) raised the bar by using a $100 stake, and Slonim and Roth
(1998) went further by finding an alternative way (running the experiment in coun-
tries where average per-capita income is significantly lower than in the developed
west) to run high-stakes experiments. Cameron’s (1999) study is along the same fash-
ion with Slonim and Roth (1998): Cameron (1999) ran high-stakes ultimatum game
experiments in Indonesia. The study included Rp 5000, Rp 40,000, and Rp 200,000
stakes. These were local currency equivalents of $2.5, $20, and $100, respectively.
The experimental design included four different games. Each game consisted of two
rounds. Randomly appointed roles of subjects were same in both rounds. Stake sizes
in four games for their two rounds was determined as follows: (i) Rp 5000–Rp 5000,
(ii) Rp 5000–Rp 40,000, (iii) Rp 5000–Rp 200,000, and (iv) Rp 5000–Rp 200,000.
While the first three were real stakes, the fourth was hypothetical. Accordingly, in
addition to stake-size effects, both learning effects between the two rounds and the
difference between real and hypothetical stakes were studied.
Results showed that the first round offers were similar to offers observed in earlier
experiments: on average, 43% of the pie was offered. In the second round, it was
observed that there have been more fair offers in all games. Mostly 50–50% divi-
sions were offered. Statistically, there was no difference between the first and the
second rounds, and this showed that increases in the stake size did not decrease offers.
Proposer behaviour did not converge to subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with an
increasing stake size either. All comparisons point towards the same conclusion: pro-
poser behaviour was invariant to stake-size. Moreover, comparing behaviour across
real and hypothetical stakes, there was no statistically significant difference between
offers. Nevertheless, responders appeared to be less likely to accept low offers when
hypothetical offers were present. Finally, a comparison between the first three games
showed that as stake size increases, the acceptance rate increases as well. All in all,
one can say that these results on the stake-size effect present a mixed picture.
Rabin’s (1993) fairness equilibrium and reciprocal kindness theory soon became
very popular among experimental and behavioural economists studying distribution
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Fig. 1 Rejection rates across
trials (dashed line low-stake).
This figure is regenerated from
List and Cherry (2000) by using
the data in Table 2




















problems. Dickinson (2000) applied Rabin’s reciprocal kindness model to ultimatum
bargaining to test this theory. As a part of this test, the author varied the stake size from
$1 to $15 (the intermediate values were $2, $4, and $7). In line with Rabin (1993), the
model predicted less kindness being offered by the proposers and less kindness being
accepted by the responders as stake size increases. The results based on data from 100
ultimatum games showed that stake size had only a marginally significant influence on
offers (in percentage terms). Given the small size of even the highest stake (i.e., $15),
not surprisingly, the author concluded that with small stakes, fairness considerations
dominate monetary considerations.
List and Cherry (2000) used a multiple-round design similar to that of Slonim and
Roth (1998), to analyse how ultimatum proposals are influenced by changes in stake
size. The authors wanted to reduce subjects’ tendency towards making symmetric
offers. To do that, they developed an experimental design which lead subjects to form
entitlements/obligations: Subjects had 45min to answer 17 questions from a GMAT
exam. If the proposers cannot answer more than 10 questions correctly, the stake will
be $20; if they can, it will be $400. Later, subjects were divided into two roles as usual,
i.e. proposer and responder; and each subject played the ultimatum game 10 times.
Proposers played with a different (and randomly selected) responder each period.
In addition to Slonim and Roth’s (1998) findings, List and Cherry (2000) found
that learning occurs across rounds only if stake size is sufficiently large (see Fig. 1).
This result is in line with Smith–Walker hypothesis in that subjects were involved
in cognitively costly activities only when stakes are high. According to their results,
rejections were less frequent in later periods. Moreover, there was no difference in
behaviour across games with high and low stakes, as far as the first round behaviour
is concerned.
In yet another study where a considerable variation in stake size was implemented,
Munier andZaharia (2003) investigated the effect of afifty-fold increase in stake size on
subject behaviour. The experiment was conducted in France and Romania, in 1996 and
1997, with the paper-and-pencil method. Since the experiment was conducted in two
different countries using different currencies, a common currency, ECU (experimental
currency unit) was used; and the exchange rate was set as 1000 ECU=40 French
Francs=40,000 Lei. The experiment was carried out with 1000 ECU for 5 periods
and with 50,000 ECU for another 5 periods. At the time of the experiment, 50,000
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ECU was equal to four times average monthly income of the participants in Romania.
Proposers wrote their offers on a paper called the offer bulletin whereas responders
wrote their answers on another paper called the decision bulletin; and both bulletins
were given to the experimenter. These offers and answers were paired up randomly to
determine subjects’ earnings. Throughout the experiment, the role of each subject was
fixed. This design choice enabled the authors to test for possible learning effects. To
make sure that amounts are thoroughly considered each time, subjects were asked to
write their offers/responses in ECU currency and their own currency on another paper.
In this fashion, subjects converted ECU to their own currency each time they make a
decision. Therefore, they would be aware of how much money their decision involved
in their local currency. Results showed that, in both countries, the average minimum
acceptable offer was significantly lower when the stake was 50,000 ECU. Again, in
both countries, proposers offered more and converged to a 50–50% allocation when
the stake was 50,000 ECU.
In more than two decades after the first ultimatum game experiment, dozens of
studies were conducted. Hence, there was enough data for a meta-analysis. Meta-
analysis studies have greater statistical power (to detect an effect) than individual
studies and are less prone to biases than individual studies. Oosterbeek et al. (2004)
carried out a meta-analysis on 75 experiments from 37 papers published from 1982
to 2003. Stake size was one of the variables they investigated. Their study showed
that (i) as stake size increases, the ultimatum offers decrease, (ii) there is no learn-
ing effect in repeated ultimatum games, and (iii) ultimatum offers are higher when
strategy method15 is used. From the responder perspective, they found that rejections
decrease as stake size increases. Clear results they found on the effect of stake-size is
encouraging for this line of research.
Carpenter et al. (2005), in resemblance with Forsythe et al. (1994), analysed the
effects of stake size on subject behaviour in the ultimatum game by varying the stake
between $10 and $100. As an advantage over many other studies, many individual and
demographic variables were also controlled.16 In only one of the 39 ultimatum games,
an offer was rejected. The average offer in $10-game was 45% and the average offer
in $100-game was 41%.Median offers were 50 and 45%, respectively. Consequently,
the study reached the conclusion that in ultimatumgames, stake-size does not influence
proposer behaviour. In light of earlier researchwhich found that the variation used here
is not sufficiently salient and very asymmetric offers are rare in standard ultimatum
game experiments, this finding is expected.
As of 2007, almost all studies testing the stake-size effect in ultimatum game exper-
iments to date have used student subjects. In one of the first attempts to change this to
reach more external validity, Fu et al. (2007) used a nationally representative subject
pool and controlled many socio-economic variables. One of the issues they focus on
15 In the strategy method, subjects declare their decisions for all their possible roles and for all possible
situations beforehand. For example, in an ultimatum game, they announce what will be their offer when
they are proposer, what will be their answer to all possible offers. After that, roles of players are determined,
they are paired up with each other and payoffs are determined according to their strategies.
16 A recent study by Griffin et al. (2012) also investigated racial differences in ultimatum game behaviour.
The authors varied the stake-size between $5 and $100. They concluded that stake-size did not significantly
affect responders’ acceptance decisions.
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Fig. 2 Andersen et al.
(2011)—offer proportions across
stakes. This figure is regenerated
from Fig. 1 in Andersen et al.
(2011)



















is the effect of monetary stakes on ultimatum game behaviour. They had around 800
adults (mean age, 41 years), randomly selected from the Taiwanese population to play
the ultimatum game. Half of these participants played a low-stake game (NT $200)
and the other half played a high-stake game (NT $1000). The researchers reported that
at the time of the study, the ongoing hourly wage rate in Taiwan was NT $100 and the
survey took about 30min to complete. They reported that raising the stakes reduces
the frequency of high (fair) offers and the frequency of rejection of non-negligible
offers, which are both in line with Smith–Walker hypothesis.
Most of the studies investigating stake-size effects in ultimatum games focused on
proposer behaviour. On the other hand, Andersen et al. (2011) focused on how respon-
ders would behave (i.e., respond to low offers) when the stake size is considerably
large. This question was not given a satisfactory answer before since proposers in
ultimatum games almost never make very low offers. In the current study, even if the
authors used very high stakes they must have still believed that they may not observe
very low offers; and this is probably why they explained the reasoning behind the
subgame perfect equilibrium behaviour (i.e, offering almost zero) in the instructions
they gave to proposers.17
The experimentwas conducted in eight villages located inNorthwest Indiawith 458
subjects. Each subject played the game once with a randomly assigned role (proposer
or responder). Stakes were Rp 20 (roughly 1.6h salary), Rp 200, Rp 2000, and Rp
20,000. As it can easily be calculated, the highest stake, Rp 20,000, is equivalent to a
1600h salary and this was the largest stake (in real terms) used in ultimatum games
so far.
Their results showed that ultimatum offers decrease as stake size increases (see
Fig. 2). 88% of the offers were below 30% of the stake size.
More precisely, 20% of the offers were below 10% of the stake size; 28% of the
offers were between 10 and 20%, and 40% of the offers were between 20 and 30%.
Average offers were higher (in % terms) when the stake size was Rp 20. Another
important result is that the rejection rate fell—for proportionally identical values—
with larger stake sizes (see Table 3).
17 Since the aim of the study is analysing the behaviour of the responders, the possible experimenter demand
effects resulting from the mentioned explanation does not pose a problem.
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Table 3 Andersen et al. (2011)—rejection rates across stakes
20 Rps 200 Rps 2000 Rps 20,000 Rps
% of rejections 46.43 36.00 19.57 0.00
This table is regenerated from Table 2 in Andersen et al. (2011) focusing on the “no wealth” treatment
Among all ultimatum game experiments in the literature, proposer and responder
behaviour observed in the Rp 20,000 game in this study is the one closest to subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium predictions. This result is important since it implies that
predictions of theoretical models may hold true if sufficiently high amounts are at
stake, which is in line with hypotheses in Rabin (1993), Smith andWalker (1993), and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). We think that running more experiments with liberally
high (and real) stakes such as the one in Andersen et al. (2011) is important to reach
more informative results on this important issue.
Another recent study on the effect of stake size on subject behaviour was in stark
contrast with Andersen et al. (2011) in terms of their stake-size choice. Amir et al.
(2012) ran online ultimatum, dictator, trust, and public good games on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Mturk) platform with 756 subjects. Treatments with real incentives
used $1 as the stake size. Their results showed that proposers offered on average
49.7% of the stake and responders specified their minimum acceptable offer to be on
average 33.7% of the stake. Amir et al. (2012) concluded that there was no significant
difference between their results and the results of laboratory experiments using higher
stake sizes. This result was valid for all four games they considered. It is important for
experimental economists since it may have implications for experimenters’ choices of
incentive levels: if it is true that using $50 and $5will notmake a difference, whywould
one use $50 after all? Nevertheless, we think that these results should be interpreted
with caution since Mturk is an online platform which means the opportunity cost for
participating in this experiment was probably significantly lower than participating in
a laboratory experiment andMturk participants are probably more used to small-stake
decisions than laboratory participants are.
The last study we want to mention in this subsection differs from the earlier ones
in one important aspect. Zhou et al. (2014) studied the (ab/pre)sence of stake-size
effects using FMRI data from a series of ultimatum games. Their study can be thought
as a (neuro)experimental test of the prediction “as the stake size increases mone-
tary considerations dominate fairness considerations” (see Rabin 1993; Bolton 1991).
Experimental sessions were conducted in China and 28 people participated in the
study. The low stake size was between 4 and 6 Yen and the high stake was between
400 and 600 Yen. At the behavioural level, the authors found a support for the hypoth-
esis mentioned above: rejection rates for (comparable) unfair offers were significantly
lower under high stakes than in low stakes. Another interesting finding was related to
the identity of the proposers. The authors had computers and real human beings as pro-
posers in different treatments. They reported that the stake-size effect on the rejection
behaviour of responders mentioned above was valid only in the “human” condition.
This implies that “. . . the modulation effect of fairness by monetary incentives only
exists in social interactions situations”.
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3.2 Other Bargaining Games
Although the ultimatum game is the most popular bargaining protocol in experiments,
there are some studies using other bargaining protocols such as Nash bargaining,
alternating offers bargaining, and unstructured bargaining. Here, we focus on studies
where stake-size is varied.
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) in what can be considered as one of the first experimen-
tal economics studies conducted experiments on buyer-seller negotiations frequently
observed in real life. In these market games, the buyer sets the price and the seller
chooses the amount of goods he wants to sell at that price. Subjects played this game
repetitively. Until the last period, low stakeswere used and in the last period high stakes
were introduced. Fouraker and Siegel’s analyses showed that the average prices set by
buyers and the average amounts set by sellers do not differ across games with lower
and higher stakes. However, the variance of these variables was four times higher in
the games with lower stakes, which is in line with the Smith–Walker hypothesis.18
A decade after Ståhl (1972) wrote his piece on sequential bargaining, Rubinstein
(1982) published his seminal article on alternating offers bargaining. This paper had a
huge impact on bargaining research and soon the Rubinstein–Ståhl (alternating offers)
bargaining model became the most popular non-cooperative model of bargaining. In
the two-player Rubinstein–Ståhl bargaining model, one of the players makes the first
offer. If the other player accepts the offer, the game ends; if he does not, then he
makes an offer to the other player. The game continues with players taking turns in
making offers (in an alternating fashion) until an agreement is reached. One theoretical
prediction is that the players will agree in the first period (known as the immediate
agreement result). The distribution of the pie in this agreement is also determined by
this prediction.
A natural question for many academics was the predictive power of Rubinstein–
Ståhl bargaining model. In their paper where they tested the validity of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium prediction in the Rubinstein–Ståhl bargaining model with a
two-period experimental design, Binmore et al. (1985) discovered that most subjects
behaved in line with the equilibrium prediction.
Soon after Binmore et al. (1985), some researchers rightfully thought that an exper-
iment using a two-period game is not good enough to test the predictive power of
alternating offers bargaining model. Neelin et al. (1988), devised two, three, and five
period designs. They also varied the pie-size to measure the robustness of their results
to variations in the pie-size. The part of this experiment that is related to our study is
the one where thirty undergraduate students played the Rubinstein–Ståhl bargaining
game with $5 and $15 pies. The results showed that average offers (34 and 34%) and
average rejection rates (26 and 30%) did not differ across games with different pie
sizes.
In a study similar to Binmore et al. (1985), Güth and Tietz (1987) investigated
subjects’ behaviour in a two-period game in which if no agreement is reached in the
18 It should be noted that the actual aim of this experiment was not to measure the effects of the amount
of money used on the subjects’ behaviour. Accordingly, the change in stakes was implemented only in the
last period. Factors such as experience, last period, and boredom effects might have introduced confounds.
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first period, the value of the pie falls to 0.1 or 0.9 of its original value in the second
period. In this experiment, each player played both roles (first making an offer, then
receiving an offer) once. Researchers varied the pie (e.g., DM5, DM15, and DM35)
to measure the effect of pie-size on behaviour. Increasing it from DM5 to DM35 had
different effects on behaviour in games with a 0.1 discount factor than in games with
a 0.9 discount factor. However, all in all, varying the pie-size did not result in any
substantial change in behaviour. This study is important in that its results raised an
interesting question about a possible interaction between time preferences and stake-
size.
Sonnegård (1996) studied the effects of (i) assignment methods (i.e., random selec-
tion, contest, etc.) that determine the first proposer in different ways, (ii) labels and
frames in instructions, and (iii) stake-size in bargaining games. He used a two-period
bargaining game with alternating offers. In case of rejection of the first offer, a con-
siderable portion (80%) of the pie is lost before the second period. The part of the
experiment we are interested in here is the one where the author used 50 Swedish
Crowns (equivalent of $6 on the date of the experiment) as the low stake and 500
Swedish Crowns (equivalent of $60) as the high stake. His results showed that fewer
disagreements were observed when the stake was higher.
Up to now, all studies we mentioned are either controlled lab (or field) experiments
or meta-analysis studies that used controlled experiments. In that aspect, Goldreich
and Pomorski’s (2011) study is a rare and precious one in the bargaining literature:
they used a data set acquired from online poker tournaments and investigated which
type of players initiated the negotiation process more frequently and under what cir-
cumstances were the negotiations successful. These poker tournaments start with 900
players and as players who run out of chips quit, the number of players are reduced
to nine (or less) towards the end of the game. When there are nine or less players
remain, any one of the players can propose a distribution of the pot as an alternative
to resuming the game; and the players can negotiate on the basis of this offer. The
bargaining protocol is free-form.
Goldreich and Pomorski (2011) collected data between April and July in 2007
and created a data set comprising of 1246 tournaments. The average prize pool in
these tournaments was around $80,000 and the maximum prize was over $1,000,000.
Therefore, in terms of stake-sizes it covers this study is a very rare one. In this data
set, proposals were made and a consecutive agreement was reached in 31% of the
tournaments and proposals were made but no agreement was reached in 34% of the
tournaments.
The results of regression analysis conducted on the effects of the prize pool (stake
size) on the probability of a bargaining proposal or the likelihood of an agreement are
surprising. In five regressions using different combinations of variables the size of the
prize pool had a quite small yet statistically significant effect on the aforementioned
dependent variables. However, when the researchers analysed a sub-data-set that com-
prised of the tournaments with prize pools less than $100,000, they discovered that the
size of the prize pool did not have any significant effect on the dependent variables.
This is a very interesting result given the extraordinary large stakes involved in these
tournaments: it is in line with the results of many lab experiments that vary stake-size
123
306 E. Karagözoğlu, Ü. B. Urhan
mildly (e.g., $5 vs. $10, $10 vs. $50 etc.) and in contrast with others that introduce
very large stakes (e.g., Andersen et al. 2011).
Güth and Kirchkamp (2012) studied the effect of stake-size in the Yes–No game.
The Yes–No game is a variant of the ultimatum game where the responder does not
know the offer when responding. In Straub andMurnighan (1995), offers were known
by responders but stakes were not; and in Güth and Kirchkamp (2012), stakes were
known by responders but offers not.19 Two different stake sizesweree100 ande1000.
In addition, the authors also incorporated data from Gehrig et al. (2007) where e20
was used. Another important difference from many other studies is that, Güth and
Kirchkamp used a within subject design to investigate stake-size effects, i.e. each
player made a decision both for a e100 and a e1000 stake. In the pooled data, they
found that the average offered share was 0.376 of the stake in the low-stake (e100)
gamewhereas it was 0.364 of the stake in the high-stake (e1000) game. The difference
is very small but highly significant. On the other hand, the average rejection rate
was 6.6% in the low-stake game whereas it was 4.5% in the high-stake game. The
difference is again small but yet again significant. As the authors acknowledged (see
Güth and Kirchkamp 2012, p. 664), the statistical significances of these economically
small effects may be due to the large number (1175) of subjects in their study.
Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2015) investigated how subjects’ fairness judgements were
formed and later influenced bargaining under different circumstances. They employed
a bargaining problem with joint production.20 Accordingly, pairs were given a real-
effort task and their joint performance influenced the amount which they later will be
bargaining over. The main factors that separate Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2015) from
most others in the literature is that this study used unstructured bargaining protocol
and the bargaining pie was not exogenously given but rather produced by subjects. In
unstructured bargaining, subjects in each pair are given a fix period of time to reach
an agreement. If they can agree within this time period, they get their agreed shares
of the pie. If they do not, parties receive their disagreement payoffs.
In Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2015) study, stakes were determined by the joint perfor-
mance of subjects in every group and could take three values: e9, e13.5 or e18. The
authors checked the robustness of their results to changes in stake-size. Their results
show that average fairness judgements, average time needed to reach an agreement,
and average agreed shares remain the same under different stakes. Nevertheless, these
results should be interpreted with caution since the high stake was only twice the low
stake.
Camerer et al. (2015) studied dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and
one-sided private information. The major novelty of their study is that using Myer-
son’s (1979, 1984) revelation principle, they derived some theoretical predictions.
One prediction that is of interest for us stipulates that the disagreement rates should
be monotonically decreasing in pie size. In the experiment, there are six possible pie
19 The authors used different media (e.g., lab, newspaper, internet) and reached different subject pools
(e.g., newspaper readers, business executives, students). They also used different payment methods (e.g.,
paying everyone their full earnings, randomized payment).
20 For a comprehensive survey of experiments on bargaining games with joint production, see Karagözoğlu
(2012).
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sizes ranging from $1 to $6. Pie size is known to one of the players whereas the other
player knows that it is drawn randomly from a commonly known discrete uniform
distribution. Randomly matched informed and uninformed players bargain for 10 s in
an unstructured fashion. This is repeated for 120 periods with stranger matching proto-
col. Subjects’ payoffs were calculated on the basis of their profits in randomly chosen
15% of the periods plus a $5 show-up fee. There were 110 subjects from Caltech and
UCLA. Results indicate that disagreement rates indeed monotonically decrease in pie
size. Moreover, they found a stake-size effect on the distribution of the pie: when the
pie-size is small or medium, equal-splits were more frequently observed; and when
it is high, informed parties received more than half of the pie. It is very striking (and
in stark contrast with all of the earlier studies) that the authors obtained stake-size
effects with such a small variation in stake size. Their findings may be considered
as a support for the argument in Camerer and Hogarth (1999), which stipulated that
stake-size effects may vary across different tasks/games.
4 Distribution Games
In this section we review experimental studies on the dictator game, the trust game
and variants, the public good game, and some other games where authors varied the
size of the stakes. These games involve a certain distribution problem yet they are not
bargaining problems. Hence, we categorize them as distribution games.21
4.1 Dictator Games
In the standard dictator game, the decision of how to divide the money belongs only to
the proposer, i.e., all initiative is on his hands. The proposer (or dictator) determines
the division of the pie and it is implemented. The other player has no chance to make
an alternative offer or to reject the offer at hand. It is expected that completely selfish
players will take all the money for themselves. In contrast with ultimatum games,
there is no fear of rejection for the proposer in dictator games. Therefore, if and
when a proposer shares the pie with the other player in the dictator game, this is
interpreted as an indication of fair-mindedness (Camerer 2003, pp. 43–100).22 The
results of many dictator game experiments show that proposers (or dictators) usually
offer non-negligible shares (about 20–30%) to other players.
Sefton (1992) is one of the earliest studies focusing on the implications of using
“random pay” method in economic experiments. This method proposes paying only
a certain percentage of subjects as opposed to full pay (i.e., paying all subjects). In
testing whether random pay leads to the same behavioural patterns as with full pay,
Sefton (1992) used the dictator game as a test bed. In the random pay treatment, only
25% of subjects were paid their shares from a dictator game that involves $5, whereas
21 “Non-bargaining distribution games” might have been more informative. We are aware of the fact that
these games also involve an efficiency component. At the cost of using the label “distribution games” in a
way possibly different than the standard one, we use it to differentiate them from bargaining games.
22 For alternative/opposing arguments, the reader is referred to Bardsley (2008) and List (2007).
123
308 E. Karagözoğlu, Ü. B. Urhan
in the full pay treatment all subjects were paid. Results clearly rejected the equality of
shares given by the dictators across two treatments. In particular, subjects were more
generous in the random pay treatment.
Cherry et al. (2002), in their frequently cited article, made two alterations to the
well-known dictator game and analysed the effect of these alterations on behaviour.
In the standard dictator game, the dictator role is assigned to one of the players in a
random fashion. Another important point is that the standard version is not double-
blind, i.e. it allows researchers to identify subjects with their decisions. Cherry et al.
(2002) analysed the possible effects of changing these two design details on subjects’
behaviour. They assigned the dictator role on the basis of subjects’ performances in a
contest and used a (double-blind) design that did not allow experimenters to identify
subjects’ decisions. Stake size was determined at the contest stage (answering trivia
type of questions). In this stage, subjects were not informed about the dictator game
they will play in the second stage. In the dictator game stage, stake size was $40 if the
more successful subject in the contest stage has 10 or more correct answers out of 17
and it was $10 if he/she had less than 10 correct answers.
The main results of this study were as follows: (i) in the control treatment in which
dictatorship was assigned randomly, 19% of dictators did not give any share to the
other player in the $10-game; this ratewas 15% in the $40-game, (ii) in the treatment in
which dictators were determined according to their performances in the contest, 79%
of all dictators did not give any share to the other player in the $10-game; this rate was
70% in the $40-game, and (iii) in the double-blind treatment in which dictators were,
again, determined according to their performance in the contest, 97% of all dictators
did not give any share to the other player, when the stake size was $40. Cumulative
distributions of offers in different treatments also looked identical for $10 game and
$40 game. These results are in line with a hypothesis that the behaviour in the dictator
game is not systematically influenced by changes in stake size, even when dictator
roles are earned. The only difference related to stake size was that the effect of the
double-blind protocol (e.g., offers converging to zero) when the stake was earned was
less pronounced in the low-stake compared to the high-stake game.
One of the important questions investigated in Carpenter et al. (2005) is the effect
of stake size on behaviour in a dictator game. These authors conducted dictator game
experiments with stake sizes, $10 and $100. The experimental design is similar to the
one in Forsythe et al. (1994). Besides the use of a $100 large stake, another novelty
of this experiment is that the authors controlled many individual-level variables such
as Machiavellian tendencies, risk aversion etc. and many demographic characteristics
such as age, sex, education level, income level of family, ethnic origin, number of
siblings etc. Since $100 is a noteworthy amount, we suppose this may have limited the
number of subjects: 19 players played the game with a $10 stake and 21 players with
a $100 stake. In the game with a $10 stake, the average share given to second players
was higher (33%) than in the game with a $100 stake (25%). Nevertheless, this result
was due to an outlier in the former game, which gave all of $10 to the other player.
After removing this outlier from the data set, all statistical tests lead to the same result:
there is no effect of stake size on dictator behaviour. On the other hand, the authors
conducted the same analysis using median instead of mean: median share given in
the $10-game was 40% while it was 20% in the $100-game. However, the authors
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do not report any statistical significance about this difference. On the other hand,
something worth mentioning is that authors found that some individual characteristics
such as race, number of siblings, risk attitudes, family income, endowments etc. have
a potential to explain behaviour.
List and Cherry (2008) can be seen as a variant of Cherry et al. (2002). These
researchers used the design in Hoffman et al. (1994) as a control treatment and carried
out two more treatments. In the asymmetric treatment, subjects chosen as dictators
worked on a 45min test to generate the stake that is going to be divided afterwards.
In the symmetric treatment, both players worked on the test to generate the stake. Ten
or more correct answers in the test generated $100 and less than ten correct answers
generated $20. Even though the data is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase
in stake size increases shares given by dictators (at a rate less than the rate of increase),
statistical tests do not offer any such evidence since the variation in data set is so small.
Ben-Ner et al. (2008) studied the giving behaviour in dictator games with hypothet-
ical versus real money ($10). Their most important contribution, in our opinion, lies
in the potentially relevant variables they controlled. Using questionnaires, they con-
trolled for personality traits (big five) and cognitive abilities. Their findings suggest
that the giving behaviour of an average subject was not different across real versus
hypothetical conditions. Nevertheless, they observed that two factors, agreeableness
and extraversion, interacted with the payment condition (hypothetical vs. real) sig-
nificantly. More precisely, subjects with high agreeableness scores gave more when
playing with real money, whereas subjects with high extraversion scores gave more
when playing with hypothetical money. These valuable observations would not be
obtained if these factors were not elicited, which also highlights the importance of the
subject recruitment and data collection method we discuss in this paper.
More recently, Engel (2011) conducted a meta-analysis with a rich data set from
more than a hundred dictator game experiments. In the data the researcher used to
investigate stake-size effects, the stake varied from $0 to $130, with a mean of $21.77.
Meta-analysis results using the whole data set found an insignificant stake-size effect.
Yet another surprising result is that hypothetical versus real stakeswere reported to lead
to similar behaviour. Nevertheless, when the analysis is restricted to those treatments
that manipulated stake-size, then there is a significant stake-size effect: higher stakes
reduced dictators’ willingness to give.
A study by Bellemare et al. (2013) focused on the sensitivity of guilt aversion to
changes in the stake size in dictator game experiments. In theirMAIN treatment, they
had 142 dictators. Each dictator was confronted with three games, which differed in
stake size. The details are shown in Table 4.
It is clear that if the dictator cares only about his own monetary payoff, he’d choose
r in all three games. If the dictator has guilt aversion, then he is expected to choose
l. Finally, the dictator may be guilt averse but the degree of his guilt aversion may
be sensitive to stake. The authors elicit passive players’ first-order beliefs about how
many dictators out of ten would choose option l. Dictators make their decisions for
each game knowing that they will be randomly matched to the first-order belief of one
passive player for each decision they made.
The authors reported that 101 of the dictators are stake-sensitive in their guilt
aversion. And most subjects became more selfish (or less guilt averse) as stake-size
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Table 4 Bellemare et al. (2013)—experimental details
Games/decisions Option l Option r
Game 1 50 DK for the dictator, 48 DK for the
passive player
54 DK for the dictator, 22 DK for the
passive player
Game 2 100 DK for the dictator, 96 DK for
the passive player
108 DK for the dictator, 44 DK for
the passive player
Game 3 200 DK for the dictator, 192 DK for
the passive player
216 DK for the dictator, 88 DK for
the passive player
DK Danish Krone
increased. Only 39 of the dictators were stake-insensitive. Moreover, their structural
estimation results confirmed the same result: people become more selfish as the stakes
increased. It is remarkable that with a stake-size variation not larger than many earlier
studies, Bellemare et al. found clear results stake-size effects.
Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) reported that a simple manipulation of dictators’
strategy spaces (i.e., allowing them to take away from the other agent), the giving
behaviour in the dictator game can be altered (e.g., dictators in the new game become
less generous). Along similar lines Leibbrandt et al. (2015) manipulated whether
dictators could GIVE to or TAKE from another individual andwhether the endowment
was moderate (LOW) or very large (HIGH). Their experiment was conducted in rural
Bangladesh. Low stake was roughly a day’s earning (100 tk), whereas the high stake
was equal to a five months’ earning (10,000 tk). The authors observed that absolute
money amounts offered/left by dictators are higher under high stake than in low stake
(1816 tk vs. 27 tk). However, the proportion of the stake offered/left by dictators was
lower under high-stake than in low stake (18 vs. 27%, p = 0.087). Understandably,
the proportion of dictators who chose equal-split was also affected by the stake-size
manipulation. This ratio is 9.5% for the high stake, whereas it is 21% for the low stake.
More interestingly, the authors observed an interaction effect between treatments. In
particular, stake-size manipulation influenced dictator behaviour in the GIVE frame
but not in the TAKE frame. On average, dictators allocated 25% in low stake GIVE
condition, but only 3.7% in high stake GIVE condition (p < 0.001, MW test). In
contrast, these average figures were not statistically different across low-stake TAKE
and high-stake TAKE conditions.
4.2 Trust Games and Variants
In the trust game (Berg et al. 1995), the first player (sender) chooses to send some
share—giving nothing is also allowed—of a stake to the other player (receiver). Then,
this amount is multiplied with a number larger than one—in this case, this number
is three—and given to the receiver. After that, the receiver may send back some part
(again, giving nothing is allowed) of this larger amount to the sender and the game
ends.
Parco et al. (2002) analysed the effect of financial incentives on decisions in the
centipede game. The centipede game is a finite sequential game where two players,
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in an alternating fashion, decide on whether to take a slightly larger share of a slowly
increasing pot, or to pass the pot to the other player. Payoffs in the game are such that
if a player passes the pot to his opponent and the opponent takes the pot in the next
round, the player who passed the pot receives slightly less compared to the amount
he would have received if he had taken the pot. In Parco et al. (2002), a three-player
centipede game with 60 turns was played by two groups of 15 subjects. Each group
was divided into 5 sub-groups with 3 players each. Results showed that, compared to
the game with a lower stake, the likelihood of the game ending in the first period (i.e.,
the first player grabbing most of the pie in his first turn) was fifteen times higher with
a higher stake. So much so that, in the game with a small stake size, only 25.2% of
the first players decided to end the game, while this rate was 83.4% in the case with
a higher stake size.
Ho and Weigelt (2005) conducted multi-stage trust game experiments in United
States, China and Singapore with 386 subjects. One difference from other trust game
experiments here is that they used the strategy method and hence collected data on
subjects’ strategies (rather than actions). Subjects in their experiment played themulti-
stage trust game for 10 rounds. The high stake was 10 times the low stake. They found
that subjects exhibited significantly more trusting behaviour in the high-stake game.
Higher stake was also associated with more trustworthiness. The authors conducted
only statistical tests whereas some regression analyses might have also been useful
since there are many other factors that might be influencing subject behaviour some
of which were controlled.
In their experiment conducted in Bangladesh, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005)
analysed the effect of stake-size on subject behaviour in the trust game. They divided
subjects into three groups of 64, 59, and 62 and in each group they gave the sender 40
Taka, 200 Taka, and 1000 Taka, respectively. Hence, there were three different stake
sizes. Their results showed that amounts first players sent fell with increasing stakes
whereas amounts second players sent back were not affected by that increase. This is
similar to some of the results these authors found in a more recent study (Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2013) they conducted in rural Bangladesh, that is people trust others
less when stakes are high. It is interesting to see that the change in stake-size has
differing effects on sender and receiver behaviour. We believe that these results call
for further replication studies with more controls to understand the effect of stake-size
on behaviour.
As of 2008, therewere plenty of studies focusing on trust behaviour. Some only used
self-reported measures of trust from surveys and some used the trust game paradigm
in incentivized experiments. For instance Glaeser et al. (2000), in a seminal article,
reported that the correlation between self-reported measures of trust and behaviour in
the trust game is rather weak. In contrast, Buchan and Croson (2004) reported that
subject behaviour in a hypothetical (unpaid) trust game conducted in United States
and China is very close to the behaviour observed in trust game experiments with real
money at stake. Other authors using very small stake sizes (e2) along with slightly
higher values (e8) found no-difference results (see Sutter andKocher 2007). However,
there was no study which implemented a hypothetical trust game and a trust gamewith
real incentives together. A part of Holm and Nystedt (2008) study was dedicated to
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this. In the HYPOTHETICAL treatment, there are no financial incentives whereas
in the REAL treatment the initial stake in the trust game is 50 SEK (about $7 at
the time). The authors had further treatments (FEEDBACK vs. NO FEEDBACK) to
disentangle some potential confounding factors. Nevertheless, the behavioural shifts
due to the presence of real stakes were identical in these treatments. Real stakes did
not influence receivers’ behaviour but in contrast with the common belief that senders
would be less trusting in games involving real stakes, senders were significantly more
trusting. As the authors put it, the asymmetry present in the effect of real stakes may
be in line with the Smith–Walker hypothesis: it’s the senders who would increase their
cognitive effort when real incentives are given; receivers are not involved in much of
sophisticated cognitive activity anyway.
Similar to Holm and Nystedt (2008), Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) was also
interested in the effects of real stakes in trust games. In one part of their paper (Study
2), they had hypothetical trust game (no real payment) and potentially real trust game
(with a certain probability, subjects are paid based on their trust game decisions). These
treatmentswere run in theNetherlands and 118 university students participated. In both
treatments, subjects first earned e7.50 by performing a certain simple task; and then
they were asked to take decisions some of which concern this money they just earned.
In particular, they were asked to decide (both as a sender and a receiver) in a modified
version of the trust game where sender’s decision is whether to send the e7.50 or not,
and the receiver’s decision is to keep all of e30 (if e7.50 is sent, the receiver receives
e30) or split it equally between himself and the sender. Subjects were also asked to
guess whether the senders would return half of e30 or not. These guesses did not
differ significantly between real and hypothetical treatments. However, similar to the
corresponding finding in Holm and Nystedt (2008), senders were significantly more
trusting with (potentially) real stakes than with hypothetical stakes: 37.7% (56.3%)
sent the money in the hypothetical (real) condition.
Naef and Schupp (2009) came up with a new survey that aims to measure trust
and connect participants’ answers to survey questions to their behaviour in the trust
game, using a large, representative participant pool from Germany.23 Among other
things, they also investigated the robustness of their results with respect to stake-size.
Two possible stake sizes were e10 and e100. They found that the average transfer
was e49.9 in the e100-game and e5.16 in the e10-game: the same ten-to-one ratio
that they have in stake sizes. The distributions of transfers were not different either.
Finally, the level of trustworthiness was, again, identical across two treatments. These
results are very similar to the ones found in ultimatum or dictator game experiments
using similar stake size variations.
Johnson and Mislin (2011) conducted a meta-analysis on the data from 162 trust
game replications. More than 23,000 people from a variety of geographical locations
participated in these studies. The authors investigated the effects of many variables
23 There is a lot of important methodological details in Naef and Schupp (2009) study, which we cannot
cover here, in this kind of a paper. Hence, the interested reader is referred to the original paper for such
details.
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such as payment method, experimental protocol, simulated versus real counter-part,
geographical variation etc. They also controlled for the stake-size effect. On the point
that is of primary interest for us, they found a clear result indicating that the size of the
stake did not influence subject behaviour in any sense. Nevertheless, they note that in
only eight of the studies their data set covers, the stake was higher than $25 and only
one in those eight, trust game earnings are guaranteed (i.e., not randomized). In light
of our knowledge from the results on other experimental games, we can say that this
level of variation might not have been sufficient for the presence of stake-size effects.
It is fair to say that the question concerning the effect of stake-size on behaviour in
trust games still needs further investigation.
In a very recent article, Centorrino et al. (2015) used a two-person trust game where
senders observed short video clips of trustees before taking their decisions. Partici-
pating senders also rated these video clips along a number of dimensions. The most
important dimension was the genuineness of the trustee’s smile in the video clip. The
authors varied the money at stake: the low stake was e4 and the high stake was e8.
Their main finding is that trustee smiles in the high stake treatment are rated as more
genuine and those trustees are perceived as being more trustworthy. Consequently, a
higher percentage of senders sent money to these trustees. Nevertheless, the percent-
age of trustees returning any money to the senders is lower in the high stake game.
These results are interesting in that such a small increase in the stake size appears to
have generated sufficient incentives to create more genuine “acting” and more selfish
behaviour.
4.3 Other Distribution Games
Kocher et al. (2008) conducted the first study on the effects of stakes on cooperation
and punishment behaviour in a public good experiment. Public good game is a game
played in groups. At the beginning, each subject in the group is given a certain amount
of resource (i.e., private resources) and then they are simultaneously asked to decide
howmuch of this resource theywill keep for themselves and howmuch of the resources
they will contribute to the production of a public good that would benefit everyone in
the group. The sum of their contributions is multiplied by a number larger than one
(so that their contributions at least collectively pays off). Under reasonable parameter
values, the Nash equilibrium of this game is: none of the players contribute to the
production of public good (i.e., the well-known free-rider problem). As for the version
of public good game with the costly punishment option: after the contribution stage,
every player has the option to punish the other players by paying a certain cost, which
reduces their individual gains.
Both of these versions (with and without the punishment option) were played in
South Africa by 120 high school students, in groups of three. Every subject played the
game only once. The low stake used in the gamewas one fifth of the high stake. Neither
the average contribution of the players to the public good production nor the variation
in this amount was affected by the stake size. Additionally, the authors found out that
the punishment behaviour of the players were not affected by the stakes either. The
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314 E. Karagözoğlu, Ü. B. Urhan
results are clear and surprising. Nevertheless, the sample is somewhat non-standard:
high school students in South Africa.24 It would be interesting to see the results of
replication studies in other geographical locations and with university students or
adults.
Another study using data from a real-life event is Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010).
They investigated how certain variables affect behaviour of players by observing 630
players appearing in 315 games, in 105 episodes of a TV game show, ‘Friend or
Foe?’, which was broadcasted for two seasons starting in 2002.25 This game initially
involves players contributing to a common prize pool by answering general knowledge
questions and this stage is followed by players playing a strategic game to decide how
to share the commonly generated prize. To be more precise, if both players select the
‘friend’ option then the prize is divided equally; if both players gowith the ‘foe’ option
neither of them gets the prize, and if one of them goes with ‘friend’ and the other with
‘foe’, the player who selects the ‘foe’ option gets all the prize and the ‘friend’ gets
none. In accordance with their success in answering general knowledge questions, the
prize pool ranges from $200 to $20,000. The analysis showed that among the 630
players, 45% of them went for the ‘friend’ strategy. More importantly, the percentage
of players who opted for ‘friend’ option in the whole population of players was not
affected by the amount of the money at stake.26
Fehr et al. (2014) investigated if high monetary incentives eliminated reciprocal
behaviour or not. For this purpose, they ran gift-exchange market and complete con-
tract market experiments in Moscow. High monetary incentives used in this study
corresponded to roughly 2–3 months’ salary (at the time of the experiment) in Russia.
The low monetary incentive was one-tenth of the high monetary incentive. Games
were repeated ten times to control for potential experience and learning effects. The
results revealed that subject behaviour was not affected by the size of the stake. The
agreed salary values were similar across high and low monetary incentives. Subjects
who assumed the role of the employer—in both low and high incentives—offered the
subjects who assumed the role of the employee roughly three times the salary that
would emerge in a competitive market. The size of the stake did not appear to have an
effect on the levels of efforts exerted either. Overall, the results of this study—despite
the presence of a very high monetary incentive—were not in line with the hypothesis
that higher stakes lead fair or reciprocal behaviour to disappear.
24 For instance, we know that culture plays a role in shaping subjects’ behaviour in social interactions
(Henrich et al. 2001; Herrmann et al. 2008), which may make it difficult to generalize these findings. See
also Raihani et al. (2013) for a recent study finding behavioural differences across subjects in USA and
India in online dictator games with $1, $5, and $10 stakes.
25 This study and aforementioned Goldreich and Pomorski (2011) study are not experiments conducted in
a controlled lab environment. Such experiments are called quasi-experiments in the literature.
26 In a recent paper very similar to this one, Van denAssem et al. (2012) analysed the cooperative behaviour
in the television show, Split or Steal. The stake-size varies between a few dollars and $175,000, averaging
over $20,000. The authors found only limited support for the hypothesis that cooperation will decrease as
the stakes get larger.
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5 Discussion
It is clear that the results of studies investigating the influence of stake-size on subjects’
behaviour in bargaining and distribution game experiments are far from conclusive
and present a rather mixed picture.
Here we discuss a subject recruitment method that could potentially be useful in
answering the stake-size effect question. With this method, researchers will be able to
gather information that is relevant for research questions periodically or even repeti-
tively (before and after the experiment). This is expected to help researchers acquire
a large set of potentially important control variables that will be crucial in avoiding
confounding effects. A suggestion along the same lines also appears recently in Güth
(2012), who argued “. . . rather than distinguishing bargaining only by individuals and
groups, the astonishing heterogeneity of lab-observed bargaining behavior suggests
a better control and categorization of individual and possibly group types. . . To elicit
the appropriate characteristics, one may rely, for instance, on panels for recruiting
participants which may provide a lot of socio-demographic background information,
. . .”. Findings on the relevance of two personality factors (agreeableness and extra-
version) for giving behaviour in dictator games with hypothetical versus real money
reported in Ben-Ner et al. (2008) also support our arguments here.
In this subject recruitment system, students who want to participate in experi-
ments will initially answer some questionnaires to shed light on their behaviour in
the experiments they are to participate. These questionnaires will acquire informa-
tion on subjects regarding their risk-taking tendencies (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002;
Dohmen et al. 2011), their fairness concerns [e.g., justice sensitivity scale (Schmitt
1996), justice centrality scale (Dalbert et al. 1987), belief in a just world scale (Rubin
and Peplau 1975; Dalbert et al. 1987; Dalbert 1999)], loss aversion tendencies (e.g.,
a loss aversion measurement scale), some characteristics that may relate to tenden-
cies like altruism, selfishness [e.g., Big five personality traits (McCrae et al. 2005),
Machiavellian inclinations questionnaire (Christie and Geis 1970)], cognitive abilities
(cognitive ability/aptitude test), and factors that may relate to negotiation or distribu-
tion behaviour such as gender, age, job/market experience, area of education, number
of siblings, financial status and time/opportunity costs of subjects. There are many
experimental economics and psychology studies reporting how each and every one
of these factors affect individual behaviour in strategic decision-making situations.27
Moreover, these factors should be controlled for in an econometric analysis based on
a theoretical model whose essential elements were outlined in Sect. 2.
The students who volunteer as subjects can complete these questionnaires when-
ever they want, but reasonably before participating in an experiment, anonymously
and receiving low monetary incentives. Additionally, some of these questionnaires
(e.g. risk-taking and loss-aversion tendencies, financial status etc.) will be filled out
periodically and therefore the researcher will be able to observe the changes—if any—
27 It is worthwhile emphasizing that we are advocating to control only those variables for which there exists
some form of theory and/or wide-spread empirical evidence for the link between them and the investigated
behaviour.
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in these individual dimensions.28 It is important that the information can be obtained
periodically/repetitively since the subjects risk attitudes and financial status may not
be stable.
Thanks to the suggested subject recruitment and data collection system, the fol-
lowing primary benefits will be acquired: (i) the researcher will possess a rich and
dynamic data on the relevant individual characteristics of his/her subject pool, (ii) the
researcher will be able to save time and resources during experimental sessions, which
is expected to have positive effects in reducing boredom effects and cutting down costs,
and most importantly (iii) since many theoretically relevant factors are controlled, the
results of experiments investigating the effect of stake-size on behaviour in bargaining
and distribution games will be more sound and offer richer insights for the presence
or absence of stake-size effects.
Another benefit of this mechanism is related to a problem that is commonly referred
to as the experimenter demand effect. This phenomenon can be defined as the design
of the experiment (e.g. questions asked, instructions etc.) affecting the behaviour of
the subject through its potentially hidden clues as to the experimental manipulation
of the experiment and driving the subject not to act or behave as he/she normally
would. This phenomenon appears when the subjects are asked extensive questions
relating to the purpose of the experiment (e.g. asking many questions about fairness
in a distribution experiment). The subject recruitment and data collection methods
we propose are expected to reduce the risk of observing experimenter demand effect
since they take the questions that may relate to the purpose of the experiment out of
the experiment. Student volunteers will answer many control questionnaires that differ
drastically in content and they will do this reasonably beforehand so that subjects are
not likely to associate the purpose of the experiment with relevant questionnaires.
6 Conclusion
Experimental economics has been one of the fastest growing fields in economics in the
last 30years.Wehave examined the question ofwhether the size ofmonetary incentives
has any effect on individual behaviour in experimental bargaining and distribution
games.
Our observations can be summarized as follows: (i) possibly except for the ultima-
tum games, the number of the studies conducted is not sufficient to reach a definite
conclusion on the effect of stake size on individual behaviour; (ii) the findings of
experiments, including that of ultimatum experiments, are far from giving a clear idea
about the effect of stake size on individual behaviour; (iii) uncontrolled individual
characteristics such as co-existence of increasing relative risk aversion and increasing
cost of fairness and small sample sizes could be responsible for these vague results;
(iv) if there is indeed a stake-size effect, it can possibly be observed with the use of
28 An important concern here would be anonymity of participants. Nevertheless, this would not be a major
issue since (i) participants would be asked to generate participant id’s that conceal their identity and (ii)
payment methods that keep participant id’s anonymous to the researcher already exist and are used.
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very high stake sizes (e.g. Andersen et al. 2011); (v) the use of quasi-experiments and
meta-analysis studies can be a promising venue.
In our opinion, these observations indicate that one of the things we need is more
control in experiments. To reach clear results on the effect of stake size on individual
behaviour, we need larger sample sizes, better subject recruitment systems, and data
collection method that enables us to control potentially important variables of interest.
The need for and the importance of control is better understood if we take into account
the fact that such experiments are conducted in so many different geographical loca-
tions (e.g., rural India, Africa, Slovakia, France, Indonesia, Germany, Russia, United
States etc.) and with very different subject pools (e.g., high-school students, college
students, professional lawyers, unemployed low-income households etc.) because of
the difficulties of conducting them with considerably high stakes in developed coun-
tries (see Güth and Kirchkamp 2012, p. 660). All of these varying factors can also
introduce confounds that may lead to misleading estimates for stake-size effects. We
believe that the methods we have presented in this work have a potential to make a
valuable contribution to this literature.
Another important factor, which makes it difficult to answer the “stake-size ques-
tion” clearly is the variety of experimental designs and strategic interactions used in the
studies reported. In addition to geographical locations and subject pools, information
conditions, design details, important parameter values etc. vary across experiments.
Some studies find stake size effects with variations at the magnitude of a few dollars,
whereas some others cannot find despite a very large variation in the stake size. We
believe that disentangling the types of strategic interaction and design elements that
have an influence on the presence/absence of a stake-size effect is a challenging but
very promising venue of research.
We also believe that an increase in the number of quasi-experiments using data
from very high-stake events will be a good complement to lab experiments using the
control strategieswemention above due to obvious pros and cons of these twomethods
discussed before. Finally, meta-analysis studies,29 which promise results with greater
precision and statistical power compared to individual experiments will be important
tools for researchers.
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